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Focusing in experimental study of human behavior, this article discusses the concepts
of information and mental representation aiming the integration of their biological,
computational, and semantic aspects. Assuming that the objective of any communication
process is ultimately to modify the receiver’s state, the term correlational information is
proposed as a measure of how changes occurring in external world correlate with changes
occurring inside an individual. Mental representations are conceptualized as a special case
of information processing in which correlational information is received, recorded, but
also modiﬁed by a complex emergent process of associating new elements. In humans,
the acquisition of information and creation of mental representations occurs in a two-
step process. First, a sufﬁciently complex brain structure is necessary to establishing
internal states capable to co-vary with external events. Second, the validity or meaning
of these representations must be gradually achieved by confronting them with the
environment. This contextualization can be considered as part of the process of ascribing
meaning to information and representations. The hypothesis introduced here is that the
sophisticated psychological constructs classically associated with the concept of mental
representation are essentially of the same nature of simple interactive behaviors. The
capacity of generating elaborated mental phenomena like beliefs and desires emerges
gradually during evolution and, in a given individual, by learning and social interaction.
Keywords: information, mental representation, human behavior
INTRODUCTION
The construction of comprehensive explanatory models of human
behavior requires constant review and improvement of concepts
in order to integrate different types of structures and levels
of implementation. In this sense, this article discuss two con-
cepts frequently used for modeling different aspects of human
behavior in biological, psychological, philosophical, physical,
and computational explanatory theories. They are the concepts
of information and representation. The objective is to discuss
the interdependency between both constructs with special atten-
tion to their use in experimental investigations of cognitive
phenomena.
Brieﬂy, the idea of representation discussed here is related to the
brain’s capacity of developing inner states, in the form of relatively
stable patterns of neuronal activity, that keep some kind of rela-
tionship with events occurring in external world. In many cases,
these representations start by simple reactions to external stimuli
but, due to brain’s organizational characteristics, evolve by incor-
porating many other elements than those directly apprehensible
from the direct contact with the environment. This capacity of
constructing complex mental representations results from a long
evolutionary process but its basic constituents can be identiﬁed in
the neuronal activity of simpler organisms in the form of reactive
or conditioned behaviors, for example.
The concept of mental representation in cognitive sciences
is frequently associated to complex phenomena such as beliefs
and desires. This class of models, also known as representa-
tional theories of mind (RTM), consider that these states have
“intentionality” in the sense that they are about or refer to things,
and may be evaluated with respect to properties like consistency,
truth, appropriateness, and accuracy (Cummins, 1989).
This article proposes that the general idea of intentionality or
the propriety of mental states of maintaining a correlation with
external events can be generalized to describe even the early stages
of information processing in the nervous system. This mechanism
of co-variation, in association with memory resources and the
capacity of generating brain states related to abstract elements of
world (more speciﬁcally the capacity of deduce the rules governing
the behavior of external elements) allow the emergence of the
characteristically human cognitive traits.
This broad idea of intentionality is based in a peculiar con-
cept of information as a linking element between brains and
world. Information, as used in neurobiological research, can be
described as something intrinsically linked to the construction of
representations but at the same time as a concept not exclusive of
mental instance. Information seems to exist in natural world and
human mind has a very special capability of extracting, process-
ing, and using it to increase its capacity of interaction with the
environment.
Although frequently studied separately, the concepts of infor-
mation and representation can be described as having compu-
tational and semantic aspects. The term computational refers
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to the possibility of codiﬁcation, quantiﬁcation, manipulation,
and physical implementation of information and representations
while the term semantic refers to the meaning of both concepts in
different contexts.
Information and representation will be discussed here from
a neurobiological point of view but with the intention of
maintaining coherence with their conceptualization in computa-
tional or artiﬁcial models of cognition. This coherence requires
considering mental representations as biological phenomena,
proper but not exclusive of human minds, which construc-
tion is achieved by a mechanism of information exchange with
the external world. As we shall see below, although repre-
sentations can be localized in the brain, their meaning does
not reside exclusively in the neurobiological instance being a
characteristic of the dynamic interaction between brains and
environment.
In the following sections, the concepts of mental representation
and information will be discussed with a declared bias toward its
application in empirical problems of cognitive neurosciences. The
interest in these concepts, however, is not restrict to the study of
human cognition. Comprehensive discussions about classic infor-
mation theory can be found in Shannon (1948), Karnani et al.
(2009), Wang and Shen (2011), and Adami (2012). The nature
of mental representations in philosophy, psychology, and neuro-
sciences is discussed by Cummins (1989, 1996), Stich (1992), and
Fodor (2000). Comprehensive discussions about semantic infor-
mation are found in Floridi (2005), Karnani et al. (2009), Jensen
et al. (2013), and Vakarelov (2014).
THE EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
The paradigmatic situation faced by neuroscientists during their
experimental work can be described as follows: consider an indi-
vidual observing an object and/or carrying out a mental task while
his/her brain activity is recorded by a functional neuroimaging
machine. Based in the machine’s outputs, the scientist controlling
the experimental setup wants to know how the individual’s cog-
nition works and to what extent the machine output reﬂects the
individual experience of thinking.
Although it is possible to get some kind of information
from the machine, the descriptive capacity of this paradigm is
limited, especially in relation to the apprehensibility of sub-
jective experiences. This limitation can be expressed by the
qualia argument: although the scientist can know something
about the individual’s internal state it is impossible for an
external observer to have access to the very nature of men-
tal processes because they involve a special quality of conscious
experience that cannot be reduced to a linguistically mediated
set of descriptive elements (Kanai and Tsuchiya, 2012; Ramos,
2012).
This problem can be partially reduced by questioning the
individual about her/his subjective experience and checking
the accuracy of her/his representations of the external world.
This method, however, is limited by the capacity of the
individual in accessing their own internal states. The extra-
conscious character of many brain activities makes it impos-
sible for someone to be aware and report all elements com-
posing the cognitive experience. Even simple activities are
subject to uncontrollable perceptive distortions (optical illu-
sions, for example), spontaneous evocation of memory con-
tents, and subtle affective states that are not consciously per-
ceived.
Although neuroimaging techniques do not account for the
qualia question, they are continually improving their capac-
ity of detecting details of brain function in terms of anatomic
location and time course of events. The information obtained
by functional imaging machines is expressed in terms of elec-
trical signals or measures of metabolic activity which must be
articulated with the individual’s linguistic descriptions. Machine
recordings allow the spatial localization of structures working at
a given moment as well as mapping the time dynamics of their
interaction (Nunez et al., 2014). Thus, functional data are col-
lected and analyzed based in a general conceptualization of the
brain as an information processing device constituted by special-
ized and widely interconnected substructures working in constant
communication.
INFORMATION BASED ON RECEIVER
Probably, the most inﬂuential theory of information is that pro-
posed by Shannon (1948) based in the concept of entropy or the
uncertainty associated to the occurrence of a message. The gen-
eral communication system proposed by Shannon is shown in
Figure 1.
In a simpliﬁed form, this deﬁnition is based on the probabil-
ity of occurrence of a given message among other possible ones.
Although widely explored in computer sciences as well as in the
study of interactions between neurons and cortical areas (Bezzi,
2007; Ward and Mazaheri, 2008), this approach is not suitable for
many other applications in neurosciences. An accurate estimation
of the message probability requires previous knowledge of how
many other possible messages can possibly occur, which is fre-
quently inaccessible in behavioral studies. In addition, Shannon’s
model explicitly does not take in consideration the meaning of the
message emitted, transmitted, and received.
The question of meaning of information, centrally important
in neurosciences, has been discussed under the general topic of
semantic information. Despite the lack of consensus about its
deﬁnition, semantic information can be described as the data
and its meaning, including or not the conditions of truthful-
ness (Vakarelov, 2014). The study of semantic information has
focused in a number of problems, most of them systematized by
Floridi (2005). The main question related to the semantic aspect
of information of particular interest for this discussion is “how
can data acquire their meaning” (Floridi, 2005; Vakarelov, 2010).
Vakarelov (2010), for example, suggests a “pragmatic approach
to information where one deﬁnes the notion of information sys-
tem as a special kind of purposeful system emerging within the
underlying dynamics of the world, and deﬁnes semantic informa-
tion as the currency of the system. In this way, systems operating
with semantic information can be viewed as patterns in organized
systems.”
Returning to the general framework of Shannon’s communi-
cation system, one can says that the information transmission
process is not dependent on the meaning of the message only until
reaching the receiver component of the communication system. It
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FIGURE 1 | Information system proposed by Shannon.The red square delimits the receiver component of the system where the information’s semantic
value is determined.
occurs because the objective of sending a message is ultimately
to provoke changes in receiver’s state. These changes are what
determine the existence of the message from the receiver’s point
of view. For example, let’s consider an individual in a dark cave
populated by bats. In the absence of light and without the capac-
ity of perceiving ultrasounds, the individual can construct only
a very partial representation of the cave environment. He/she
cannot determine how many bats are inside the cave, what they
are doing, and if they are communicating with each other. The
observer’s state cannot be modiﬁed by the events occurring in
the cave due to the absence of adequate sensory mechanisms.
For the bats, however, the same environment is full of meaning-
ful information due to their capacity of emitting high frequency
sounds and analyzing its echoes. If this individual is a scien-
tist interested in understanding bat behavior, he/she can develop
instruments to detect ultrasounds otherwise unperceivable and
“extract”more information from the environment. Even with this
new instrument, the “meaning” of this new information is not
immediately clear. The only way to construct a comprehensible
picture of bat activities is by establishing correlations between
observable behaviors and the signals obtained by the machine.
Although it is impossible for the scientist to get full access to
the bat’s mind and to know how is to be like a bat, he/she can
map the modiﬁcations observed in the environment and compare
them with the modiﬁcations occurring in the machine states. If
the machine is sufﬁciently precise and the bat’s behavior is sufﬁ-
ciently sophisticated, the scientist can build a limited map of bat’s
mind.
This example can be extended to the neuroimaging techniques
in general. In brain functional studies the strategy of simply cor-
relating stationary brain states with static external stimuli has
been proved meaningless. The simple mapping of all neurons
ﬁring at the moment that a speciﬁc stimulus is presented does
not guarantee that the neural activity observed is related to that
act of observation. In order to determine the correlation level
between external world and internal brain activity, the strat-
egy is to induce changes in object’s characteristics and observe
the resulting changes occurring in brain activity. In functional
brain techniques, co-varying patterns of brain activities and object
presentation are usually obtained through several repetitions of
stereotyped taskswhich results are submitted statistical analysis. In
fact, the term stimulus used in biological research can be deﬁned
as any modiﬁcation of the environment that interferes with the
organism’s state. In this situation, the scientist can check if the
observer’s brain is receiving information by identifying changes in
neural activity that correlatewith changes occurring in the external
world.
Therefore, the process that deﬁnes the information as some-
thing signiﬁcant occurs in the receiver component of the system
(the red box in Figure 1). It does not mean that other components
are not relevant but the hypothesis to be explored in the next
sections is that the meaning of message emerges in the receiver
and any other stimuli running through the information system
that is not recognized or that does not induces modiﬁcations in
the receiver’s state is not information.
The Shannon communication system model has been applied
in modeling each step of the nervous system’s functioning. Exter-
nal stimuli work as an information source to sensory cells that
generate action potentials and excite the next neuron in the path-
way. Cortical areas work as transmitters and receivers in relation
to other areas and one person can also be modeled as transmit-
ter, receiver, noise source, or information media according to
the interest of the model. Thus, the limits of each component
of an information system in an organism are arbitrary and the
same formalism used to describe the interaction between two
neurons can, in principle, be applied to describe the interac-
tions between neuron nuclei or even between individuals in social
interaction.
DEVELOPING REPRESENTATIONS
The co-variation of an observer’s neural/mental states with
changes occurring in the external world is the ﬁrst condition for
establishing a representation of objects. Many forms of repre-
sentation can be generated by this process and several of them
may be incomplete or inaccurate. The construction of a set
of valid and useful representations requires a complementary
mechanism of validation and improvement that, in biologi-
cal organisms, can be implemented by the process of natural
selection.
Tononi (2008) suggests that “through natural selection, epi-
genesis, and learning, informational relationships in the world
mold informational relationships within the main complex that
“resonate” best on a commensurate spatial and temporal scale.
Moreover, over time these relationshipswill be shapedby anorgan-
ism’s values, to reﬁect relevance for survival. This process can be
envisioned as the experiential analog of natural selection. As is
well known, selective processes act on organisms through differ-
ential survival to modify gene frequencies (genotype), which in
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turn leads to the evolution of certain body forms and behaviors
(extrinsic phenotype).”
Thus, the acquisition of information and creation of mental
representations occurs in a two-step process. First, a sufﬁciently
complex brain structure is necessary to establishing internal states
capable to co-vary with external events. Second, the validity of
these representations must be gradually achieved by confronting
them with the environment. The hypothesis discussed here is that
the sophisticated psychological constructs classically associated
with the concept of mental representation start from simple inter-
active behaviors. The capacity of using language and interacting
in social groups allowed the gradual emergence of more complex
human mental phenomena. This development can had occurred
even by a relatively disorganized process of creation, modiﬁcation,
and correction of internal states in function of new inputs from
external world.
Therefore, it is possible to admit that the mechanisms by which
human cognition had developed are present in other classes of
organisms. For example, an insect survives in its natural habi-
tat because it can maintain a sufﬁciently accurate representation
of external world. This representation-mediated “world-insect
relationship” is limited and it even may not be considered as
of cognitive nature. However, the quality and precision of this
representation is the optimized result of a compromise between
anatomo-physiological constraints and the necessity of provid-
ing information processing resources in the context of selective
pressure in a speciﬁc niche. Partial representations may be suited
to improve survival chances because they are easier to be cre-
ated and corrected and faster to be implemented in natural life
situations.
REPRESENTING RULES
Another representational strategy that emerged along the evolu-
tion is the representation of the rules or patterns governing what
happen in the external world. For example, conditioned behaviors
in several animal species can be understood as a representation
of external regularities. The increased dog’s salivation after a con-
ditioned stimulus related to food is mediated by a representation,
established by learning, of a rule of correlation between two events.
In the human brain, similar mechanisms seem to work even
in more complex activities. Noelle (2012) reviewed evidences that
rule-guided behaviors in humans are associated with the func-
tioning of the prefrontal cortex, the basal ganglia, and related
brain structures. The author suggests that a “dopamine-based
gatingmechanism interacts with standardmodels of synaptic plas-
ticity to support the development of appropriately isolated and
dimensional prefrontal representations, giving rise to improved
generalization to novel situations when adequately diverse train-
ing experiences are provided.” According to this proposal, some
regions of the prefrontal cortex may encode references or “point-
ers” to other prefrontal areas in a representational scheme that
would allow for essentially combinatoric generalization to novel
rules. This capacity of combinatoric generalization does not
imply a “mere implementation” of symbolic rule-interpretation
mechanisms. For Noelle, “complex interactions between the rule
representations actively maintained in prefrontal cortex and the
dynamic processes of more posterior neural circuits give rise to
graded and context-sensitive patterns of performance that escape
description by a purely symbolic rule account. Also, statistical
regularities in the experiences present during the development of
prefrontal cortex can profoundly shape the kinds the explicit rules
that can robustly be represented and applied.”
The process of information processing based on representa-
tion of rules can be further enhanced by the creation of subsets
of a priori representations available for use in natural situations.
Innate behaviors, related to threat detection for example, require
the pre-existence of relatively complex representations capable of
enhancing fast protective actions. This characteristic is called pre-
paredness of fear and phobias and it has been identiﬁed also in
human behavior. Mineka and Ohman (2002) present evidences
for the existence of an evolved module for fear elicitation and fear
learning with four primary characteristics: “First, it is preferen-
tially activated by stimuli related to survival threats in evolutionary
history. Thus, fear-relevant stimuli lead to superior condition-
ing of aversive associations compared with fear-irrelevant stimuli.
Second, the module is automatically activated by fear-relevant
stimuli, meaning that fear activation occurs before conscious cog-
nitive analysis of the stimulus can occur. Third, the fear module
is relatively impenetrable to conscious cognitive control, and fear
conditioning with fear-relevant stimuli can occur even with sub-
liminal conditioned stimuli. Fourth, the amygdala seems to be the
central brain area dedicated to the fear module.”
The high velocity required by the process of identifying threats
and implementing adequate responses imply in an increased prob-
ability of errors related to the simpliﬁcation of external situations,
misinterpretation of new events, and ultimately the creation of
distorted representations. This style of cognitive functioning can
be understood under a biological perspective where, in natural sit-
uations, errors of commission (wrongly reacting to a non-threat)
are more acceptable than errors of omission (not reacting to a real
threat).
Other cognitive capacities like empathy and face recognizing
also seem to be implemented by similar mechanisms of working
with pre-prepared representations (Regenbogen et al., 2012; Kryk-
lywy et al., 2013; Prochnow et al., 2013). Admitting that the same
design strategy is used in the implementation of other cognitive
functions, this mechanism of simplifying representations in order
to facilitate stimuli responsesmay be hypothesized as playing a role
in complex phenomena associated to partial or biased evaluations
of external situations like folk psychological explanations and the
occurrence of preconceptions in social contexts.
CORRELATION AND INFORMATION
In order to differentiate from Shannon’s informational entropy,
the term correlational information is proposed here, not as a mea-
sure of probability but as a measure of how changes occurring in
external world correlate with changes occurring inside an agent.
This concept does not depend either on the physical, biologi-
cal, or linguistic nature of external object nor on the cognitive
capacity of the receiver. Correlational information depends on
the receiver capacity of modifying aspects of its internal states
in function of changes occurring in the external environment.
This receiver’s plasticity needs not to reﬂect every characteristic
of external objects because even partial representations can be
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FIGURE 2 |This figure illustrates different representational capacities of
sensory organs. (A) represents a light source emitting different colors. The
sensory organ illustrated in (B) is capable of associating the series of different
states a,b,c,d where each state is related to a different color blue, red, green,
and yellow. (C) illustrate another kind of sensory organ not capable of
distinguishing blue from green and red from yellow and, therefore,
representing the changes occurring in the exterior world by simpliﬁed set of
states (f,g).
sufﬁcient for adequate interactions with the environment. This
strategy of adopting an information model based in correlations
aims to emphasize the importance of the receiver component of
in the general model of information system.
This approach can be illustrated as follow: let’s consider an
animal visually perceiving a light source emitting different colors
(Figure 2A). If its sensory organ has the capacity of having its
state modiﬁed in a given way by each color which induces one
corresponding change of state (Figure 2B), one can says that this
animal is capable of having accurate color perception. Note that,
in this model, how exactly this correspondence is physically imple-
mented is not important. The central point is that the path blue,
red, green, yellow in the external world correspond to the path
a,b,c,d inside the organism. In contrast, if the sensory organ is not
capable of distinguishing blue from green and red from yellow, for
example, its internal representation is given by a simpler path (ﬁg)
in Figure 2C.
The representation expressed inFigure 2C is partial in compari-
son to that expressed by Figure 2B but its physical implementation
by a simpler sensory organ demands less resources. If both repre-
sentations have the same efﬁciency in preserving the animal’s life
(detecting food or predators, for example), the simplest alternative
may be the most advantageous unless new changes occur in the
environment making the exact color perception an essential trait
for survival.
According this model, the ﬂux of correlational informa-
tion along nervous system is the set of modiﬁcations gradu-
ally established along sensory cells, nerves, interneurons, and
brain structures involved in behavior expression. An advan-
tage of this concept is that these modiﬁcations are potentially
detectable by functional techniques although not always acces-
sible to an individual’s consciousness. In experimental context,
even physiological manifestations like, for example changes in
autonomic functioning or postural control can be considered
as part of the set of information that composes mental repre-
sentations. The inclusion of these not purely cognitive elements
is essential, for example, in the study of emotions where sev-
eral experiential elements cannot be adequately described by
language.
This proposal does not imply in denying the existence of inter-
nally generated states. Although mental events can occur with
a degree of independence from external inﬂuences (for exam-
ple, reﬂections, interpretations, and mathematical thinking) the
basic neural components that allowed the development of these
sophisticated capacities are closely related to those working in
other relatively more simple brain activities.
The human thinking process can run with a relative
independence from external inputs like in mental fantasies. The
correlational model proposes is that the ability of working at this
level of abstraction was acquired by the gradual improvement of
the capacity of using correlational information. Once acquired,
this ability allows to the individual to work with independence
from direct sensorial inputs and add new elements to mental con-
tents. Although fantasies can be generated with large degree of
freedom, the awareness that these contents are internally created
is given by the capacity of confronting them with external inputs.
One example of internally generated state involving pre-
prepared structures closely related with external events is the
mirror neurons system. Originally found in macaque monkeys, in
the ventral premotor cortex, area F5 and inferior parietal lobule,
this group of neurons ﬁre when the animal sees another animal (or
the experimenter) performing actions similar to those pertaining
to its natural repertoire of actions. Neuroimaging and electrophys-
iological studies indicate that mirror neurons may serve for action
recognition in monkeys as well as humans, whereas their puta-
tive role in imitation and language may be realized in human but
not in monkey (Oztop et al., 2013). Although primarily of motor
nature, mirror neurons have been associated with mental activi-
ties like intention understanding, emotions, empathy, and speech
(Acharya and Shukla, 2012).
Another examples of mental representations based in brain-
environment co-variant proprieties are those involved in the
orientation and movement in the space. Land (2014) points out
“that the motor system requires a representation of space that
maintains a consistent relationship with objects in the outside
world as the body moves within it, then this could also serve as a
model of a stable outside world of which we can be conscious. A
high-deﬁnition representation is not necessary, all that is required
is that it provides a stable framework to which detailed informa-
tion, provided by the visual pathways through the occipital and
temporal lobes, can be temporarily attached.”
The creation and recording of mental representations involves
the gradual recruiting of relatively distant but highly connected
brain components with different time dynamics. Consequently,
mental representations are not localized in speciﬁc brain regions
but they gradually emerge along the entire neuronal processing.
This idea is compatible with several neurobiological phenomena
associated with conscious experience. Shen et al. (2013) proposed
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that the experience of “insight,” described as an experience related
to a state of understanding, which emerges into one’s conscious
awareness with sudden abruptness, involves many distributed
brain regions, including the lateral prefrontal cortex, cingulate
cortex, hippocampus, superior temporal gyrus, fusiform gyrus,
precuneus, cuneus, insula, cerebellum, and some areas of the
parietal cortex.
The ability of processing complex concepts and rules governing
external events is essential to the emergence of another property
of human cognitive systems that is the possibility of anticipating
future events. The capacity of preview the occurrence of a given
stimulus can be identiﬁed even in simple organisms exhibiting
conditioned behaviors. For example, the technique of olfactory
conditioning of the sting extension response has been extensively
used to yield new insights into the rules and mechanisms of
aversive learning in insects (Tedjakumala and Giurfa, 2013).
This simple capacity of representing rules can be improved
by the development of more complex neural resources. In
fact, this capacity vary from one species to other (Seed et al.,
2012) and along the cognitive development of each individ-
ual (Wellman et al., 2001). Moreover, there are also evidences
that this representational capacity do not depend of neuronal
mechanisms but also of adequate social and cultural inﬂuences
(Moriguchi, 2014).
EMERGENCE AND COMPLEXITY
The next question, central for this discussion, is how simple mech-
anisms of correlation allow the emergence of complex abstractions
in the human mind. A possible strategy for clarifying this point
is to explore complex systems theories and its applicability at the
several structural and organizational levels evolved in the genesis
of human behavior.
The idea that complex patterns can spontaneously emerge from
simpler components is largely discussed in natural sciences and
a number of theoretical ideas have been proposed to explain
their occurrence like, for example agent-based models and genetic
algorithms (Caticha and Vicente, 2011; Gros, 2013).
One of these theoretical models in particular, known as self-
organized criticality (SOC), has received great attention as a
possible explanation for the spontaneous emergence of complex
patterns both at neural and behavioral levels. The concept of
SOC was proposed by Bak et al. (1987) as one of the mech-
anisms by which complexity arises in nature. They suggested
that “dissipative dynamical systems with extended degrees of
freedom can evolve toward a self-organized critical state, with
spatial and temporal power-law scaling behavior.” This spatial
scaling leads to self-similar “fractal” structure identiﬁable in many
conditions.
Beggs and Plenz (2003) reported evidences of this phe-
nomenon studying organotypic cultures from coronal slices of rat
somatosensory cortex. They continuously recorded spontaneous
local ﬁeld potentials (LFPs) using a 60 channel multielectrode
array and found that the propagation of synchronized LFPs activ-
ity was described by a power-law. The authors suggested the slope
of this power-law, as well as its branching parameter, indicate
the presence of SOC in these preparations. (Beggs and Plenz,
2003) found evidence that the critical branching process optimizes
information transmissionwhile preserving stability in cortical net-
works. Simulations showed that a branching parameter at value
found in the experimental preparation optimizes information
transmission in feed forward networks, while preventing run-
away network excitation. The authors called this pattern“neuronal
avalanches”and hypothesized that it could be a generic property of
cortical networks and represent a mode of activity differing from
oscillatory, synchronized, or wave-like network states.
Compatible with the ideas discussed here, the identiﬁcation
of such patterns of functioning seems to depend on the brain
functioning in context. El Boustani et al. (2009) studied intracel-
lular activity of 15 neurons in the primary visual cortex of the
anesthetized and paralyzed cat. Each neuron was recorded while
presenting four full ﬁeld stimuli through the dominant eye: a drift-
ing grating at the cell’s optimal orientation and spatial frequency,
a high spatial deﬁnition dense noise, a natural image animated
with a simulated eye movement sequence, and a grating animated
with the same eye movement sequence. The authors found the
recordings displayed power-law frequency scaling at high frequen-
cies, with a fractional exponent dependent on the spatio-temporal
statistics of the visual stimuli. They also reported that this effect
was reproduced in computational models of a recurrent network.
They noted “that the power-law relations found here depend on
the stimulus, which means that the frequency scaling exponent
does not represent a unique signature of cortical network activity,
but rather reﬂects a measure of the dynamic interplay between
the sensory evoked activity and the ongoing recurrent network
activity.”
The possibility of SOC being relevant for explaining complex
human behavior was explored by Ramos et al. (2011) who evalu-
ated groups of individuals with and without mental disorders in
social interaction during several weeks. Although the behavior of
each individual had been very different from other participants in
absolute terms, the statistical description of the different groups
(individuals with depression, psychosis, mania, and normal con-
trols) showed identical patterns of behavioral variation. In all
groups, comparing the behavior of individuals with themselves,
small changes of behavior were very frequent while large varia-
tions were rare. The characteristic of having the same variation
pattern reproduced at different levels of human activity, suggests
the presence of self-similarity (Serrano et al., 2008). The curves
describing the behavior of all clinical groups and controls showed
the same aspect and ﬁtted a power-law. The authors suggested
that the presence of self-similarity and power-laws is compatible
with the hypothesis that humans in social interaction constitute a
system exhibiting SOC.
Self-organized criticality is certainly a promising concept for
integrating biological and behavioral aspects of human behavior
under the same causal mechanisms but it doubtless requires more
empirical investigations (Hidalgo et al., 2014).
A BRIEF COMMENT ON THE SEMANTIC QUESTION
The last important point to be discussed here is the question of the
ascription of meaning in informational models of cognition. This
is a very problematic discussion in the literature that cannot be
adequately addressed in the limited scope of this article. However,
the empirical research in neurosciences demands some strategy for
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dealing with this problem due to the impossibility of understand-
ing many aspects of human behavior without considering some
form of justiﬁcation.
A possible provisional strategy is to leave the concept of
meaning momentarily aside and explore a utilitarian approach
of the mental representations. In a biological perspective, the
immediate utility of behaviors and mental representations is
increasing individual’s survival chances in different contexts. So,
although informations and representations have been deﬁned,
in this correlational approach, in function of effects observed
in the receiver component, their utilitarian character must be
apprehended only in the context of the entire communication
system.
Naturally, the idea that human cognition was molded by evo-
lutionary mechanisms is not new. Tononi (2008) explain this
hypothesis: “Brain mechanisms, including those inside the main
complex, are what they are by virtue of along evolutionary his-
tory, individual development, and learning. Evolutionary history
leads to the establishment of certain species-speciﬁc traits encoded
in the genome, including brains and means to interact with
the environment. Development and epigenetic processes lead to
an appropriate scaffold of anatomical connections. Experience
then reﬁnes neural connectivity in an ongoing manner though
plastic processes, leading to the idiosyncrasies of the individual
“connectome” and the memories it embeds.”
The general concepts of evolution theory have been used for
the explanation of several kinds of behaviors and cognitive phe-
nomena. However, this explanatory strategy still needs to be better
incorporated by empirical studies. The same attention dedicated
to developing neurofunctional techniques must also be dedicated
to the identiﬁcation and analysis to the characteristics of the envi-
ronment where the behaviors are manifested. For example, this
utilitarian characteristic of informational models suggests that
future developments in functional brain studies must consider
the use of immersive virtual reality setups as a way of controlling
the behavioral context.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article aimed to address some questions about the use of
the representation and information concepts in the context of
experimental research in cognitive sciences. The focus in the
“information based on the receiver” proposed here is justiﬁed by
the interest of developing objective approaches to the study of
human behavior in biological and semantic terms. This search for
new conceptual approaches took the risk of being superﬁcial in its
formalism but it was proposed as a ﬁrst step for the description
of the different elements that contribute to the construction of
mental representations.
The correlational information concept discussed here aimed
to be sufﬁciently simple to allow a naturalization of the infor-
mation concept in the sense that all interaction between physical
entities can be seen as an informational phenomenon. In this
model, the construction of mental representations can be seen
as a special case of information processing in which correla-
tional information is received, recorded, but also modiﬁed by a
complex, emergent, and possibly stochastic process of associat-
ing new elements. The validity of these new internally generated
constituent elements is granted by its continuous confrontation
with new external inputs and by the selection of the most adequate
representations in relation to its capacity of improving survival
chances.
The hypothesis is that this basic mechanism works in all ani-
mal species but, with the improved human brain capacity, it leads
to the emergence of higher order or abstract descriptive elements
of external objects that allow the prediction of future events. This
process is possible by themanipulation of internal states represent-
ing not only objects but also the rules governing their behavior.
In this model, although the content of correlational information
depend on the receiver capacity of creating internal states capable
to co-vary with external events, the utility of a given informa-
tion can be apprehended only by the observation of the entire
communication system.
The continuous process of collecting information, creating rep-
resentations, generating predictions, comparing with outcomes,
and adjusting them in order to optimize their accuracy is compat-
ible with several psychological models of learning and cognitive
development. This mechanism of correlational representations is
also compatible with a Bayesian conception of cognitive function-
ingwhere partial or provisional representationswork as estimators
of a priori probabilities in dealing with future events (Tenenbaum
et al., 2011).
The ideas discussed here represent a ﬁrst approach and nat-
urally demand deeper investigations in relation to its theoretical
and empirical implications. In theoretical terms, although theo-
ries like SOC are promising in explaining human behavior, other
mathematical models also deserve attention. Caticha and Vicente
(2011), for example, argue that statistical mechanics can leads
to aggregated predictions which can be tested against extensive
data sets with partial information about populations. The pro-
cess of exchanging information and learning patterns involved in
these models can elicits collective emergent properties not found
in individual behaviors.
In relation to the empirical research, this discussion suggests
that the integrative study of the computational and semantic ele-
ments that compose human experiences will demand signiﬁcant
technical and theoretical improvements. Technically, the com-
bined register of different variables like cortical electric activity,
mapping of eye movements, measures of skin galvanic conduc-
tance, and postural control obtained during carefully planned
cognitive activities emulated in virtual reality environments,
for example, can potentially give a deeper comprehension of
the mental, affective, and motor events occurring in realistic
contexts.
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